We study generalization for preserving privacy in publication of sensitive data. The existing methods focus on a universal approach that exerts the same amount of preservation for all persons, without catering for their concrete needs. The consequence is that we may be offering insufficient protection to a subset of people, while applying excessive privacy control to another subset.
INTRODUCTION
It is often necessary to publish personal information for research purposes. For example, a hospital may release patients' diagnosis records so that researchers can study the characteristics of various diseases. The raw data, also called microdata, contains the identities (e.g. names) of individuals, which are not released to protect their privacy. However, there may exist other attributes that can be used, in combination with an external database, to recover the personal identities.
For example, assume that the hospital publishes the table in Figure 1a , which does not explicitly indicate the names of patients. However, if an adversary has access to the voter registration list in Figure 1b , s/he can easily discover the identities of all patients by joining the two tables on {Age, Sex, Zipcode}. These three attributes are, therefore, the quasi-identifier (QI) attributes.
Generalization [5, 7, 8, 9, 11, 13, 15, 17] is a common approach to avoid the above problem, by transforming the QI values into less specific forms so that they no longer uniquely represent individuals. In particular, a table is k-anonymous [13, 15] if the QI values of each tuple are identical to those of at least k − 1 other tuPermission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. To copy otherwise, to republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. ples. Figure 1c shows an example of 2-anonymous generalization for Figure 1a . Even with the voter registration list, an adversary can only infer that Andy may be the person involved in the first 2 tuples of Figure 1c , or equivalently, the real disease of Andy is discovered only with probability 50%. In general, k-anonymity guarantees that an individual can be associated with her/his real tuple with a probability at most 1/k.
Motivation
k-anonymity has several drawbacks. First, a k-anonymous table may allow an adversary to derive the sensitive information of an individual with 100% confidence. Assume that an adversary attempts to infer the disease of Joe, knowing his age 12, sex, and zipcode 22000. From the published table in Figure 1c , s/he knows that Joe may correspond to tuple 5 or 6 (the QI values of the other tuples do not cover those of Joe). The diseases of both tuples are pneumonia; hence, the adversary can declare (with 100% confidence) that Joe must have contracted pneumonia. The phenomenon is caused by the fact that, k-anonymity only prevents association between individuals and tuples, instead of association between individuals and sensitive values. Unfortunately, it is the second type of association that leads to privacy breach.
Second, a k-anonymous table may lose considerable information from the microdata. Consider a researcher who wants to obtain, from the table of Figure 1c , an estimate for the number of female patients above the age of 30. It suffices to examine tuples 7-10, because they are the only tuples that may qualify the query condition. Given only the fact that the original ages of the 4 tuples are in [21, 60] , the researcher derives the estimate by assuming a uniform age distribution. This leads to an estimate of 4 × 60−30 60−20 = 3, which significantly deviates from the actual result 1 (see Figure 1a) . The serious error arises because Mary has a much larger age than the other patients; hence, combining her age with another age incurs substantial information loss. Observe that the same problem also exists on attribute Zipcode with respect to tuple 7. Specifically, Linda's exceedingly-large zipcode decides the loose zipcode-range [30000, 60000] for tuples [7] [8] [9] [10] 1 . Third, k-anonymity does not take into account personal anonymity requirements. As mentioned earlier, from Figures 1b and 1c, an adversary learns that Andy must have suffered from either gastric-ulcer or dyspepsia, which is acceptable according to (a) Microdata (b) Voter registration list (c) A 2-anonymous table Figure 1 : Microdata, external source, and quasi-identifier generalization 2-anonymity. However, Andy may not want anyone to think (with high confidence) "Andy must have some stomach problem"; this cannot be guaranteed in Figure 1c , since both gastric-ulcer and dyspepsia are stomach diseases. On the other hand, it is possible that Linda regards flu as a common disease, and agrees to release her true diagnosis result (to enhance the effectiveness of research). In this case, it is not necessary to apply any generalization on tuple 7. Such preference variations are not captured by k-anonymity.
Contributions
In this paper, we develop a novel privacy preserving technique that overcomes the above problems. The core of our solutions is the concept of personalized anonymity, i.e., a person can specify the degree of privacy protection for her/his sensitive values. To illustrate the concept, consider Figure 2 , which demonstrates a simple taxonomy on attribute Disease. The taxonomy is accessible by the public, and organizes all diseases as leaves of a tree. An intermediate node carries a name summarizing the diseases in its subtree. Some part of the tree is omitted since it is not relevant to our discussion.
A personal preference can be easily solicited from an individual when s/he is supplying her/his data. In our approach, a preference is formulated through a node in the taxonomy. As an example, for tuple 1 in Figure 1a , Andy may specify node stomach-disease (the "guarding node" for his privacy, which will be formalized in the next section). Thus, nobody should be able to infer, with significant confidence, that he suffered from any disease (i.e., gastriculcer, dyspepsia, or gastritis) in the subtree of the node. In other words, in Andy's opinion, allowing the public to associate him with dyspepsia or gastritis is as serious as revealing his true disease.
On the other hand, for tuple 7 in Figure 1a , Linda may specify ∅, which is an implicit node underneath all the leaves of the taxonomy. The empty-set preference implies that she is willing to release her actual diagnosis result flu; therefore, tuple 7 can be published directly. In general, flu may not be "sensitive" for many people, such that it is often not necessary to apply any privacy protection to this value.
In fact, personalization is an inherent notion of privacy preservation whose objective is to protect the interests of individuals at the first place. Somewhat surprisingly, so far the literature has focused on a universal approach that exerts the same amount of privacy preserving for all persons, without catering for their concrete needs. The consequence is that we may be offering insufficient protection to a subset of people (such as Andy in the above example), while applying excessive privacy control to another subset (including, for instance, Linda). Our method is more flexible, since it decides the minimum amount of necessary generalization for satisfying everybody's needs, and hence, retains the maximum amount of information from the microdata.
We present a careful study for the problem of personalized a n y anonymity. First, we formalize the concepts that underlie a new framework of computing privacy-conscious information taking into account individual preferences. As opposed to k-anonymity, our approach applies direct protection against the association between individuals and their sensitive values.
As a second step, we analyze the theory behind our methodology, and derive formulae for quantifying privacy-breach likelihood. These equations mathematically reveal the scenarios where k-anonymity can/cannot ensure safe data publication. In particular, we prove that, unlike our approach, k-anonymity (even its improved version "l-diversity" [11] ) cannot guarantee privacy protection if an individual may correspond to multiple tuples in the microdata. This is a serious defect due to the large amount of such data in practice that requires privacy control. For example, the table of Figure 1a may contain numerous records for a person if s/he has been sick for several times.
Finally, we develop an algorithm for finding a generalized table that preserves a large amount of information in the microdata without violating any privacy constraint. Utilizing several interesting problem characteristics, the algorithm optimizes the degrees of generalization on QI-and sensitive attributes, respectively. Extensive experiments verify that the output tables of our algorithm permit highly accurate data analysis.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 formalizes the general methodology of personalized anonymity. Section 3 provides its theoretical foundation, and reveals important insight into the behavior of alternative approaches. Section 4 explains an algorithm for deriving a generalized table. Section 5 experimentally evaluates the effectiveness of our solutions. Section 6 surveys the previous work related to ours, and Section 7 concludes the paper with directions for future work.
PERSONALIZED ANONYMITY
Let T be a relation storing private information about a set of individuals. The attributes in T are classified in 4 categories: (i) an identifier attribute A i which uniquely identifies a person, and must be removed when T is released to the public, (ii) a sensitive attribute A s (e.g., Disease in Figure 1a) , whose values may be confidential for an individual (subject to her/his preferences), (iii)
, whose values can be published, but may reveal a personal identify with the aid of ex-ternal information (Age, Sex, Zipcode in Figure 1a) , and (iv) other attributes that are not relevant to our discussion.
We require that A s should be categorical, whereas the other attributes can be either numerical or categorical. All the attributes have finite domains. Following the previous work [5, 7, 8, 9, 11, 13, 15, 17] , we assume that each categorical attribute A is accompanied by a taxonomy (as in Figure 2 for Disease), which indicates the publicly-known hierarchy among the possible values of A.
Our objective is to compute a generalized table T * such that (i) it contains all the attributes of T except A i , (ii) it has a generalized tuple for every tuple in T , (iii) it preserves as much information of T as possible, and (iv) its publication does not cause any privacy breach, as formulated in the next section.
Personal Privacy Requirements
We start by defining a subtree in the taxonomy of A s . The published table T * should guarantee that, for all t ∈ T , P breach (t) is at most p breach , which is a system parameter specifying the amount of confidentiality control. Figure 1a demonstrates the guarding nodes selected by the individuals involved in the microdata. For example, let t be tuple 3 (t.A i = Ken and t.A s = pneumonia). The guarding node respiratory-infection of t indicates that nobody can infer, with high confidence, that Ken suffered from a disease under respiratoryinfection in the taxonomy of Figure 2 . P breach (t) is the probability that an adversary can infer that any of the following 3 associations exists in T : {Ken, flu}, {Ken, pneumonia}, {Ken, bronchitis}.
On the other hand, Ken does not care if somebody conjectures, with any probability, that he contracted gastric-ulcer (not in SUBTR(t.GN )), since it is very different from his true diagnosis result. In general, the higher t.GN is in the taxonomy, the stronger privacy must be guaranteed.
Guarding nodes depend entirely on personal preferences, and are not determined by the sensitive values. For instance, Joe and Sam (who, as with Ken, contracted pneumonia) set their guarding nodes simply to pneumonia (tuples 5, 6 in Figure 1a ), implying that they do not mind being associated with flu or bronchitis. Specially, if a patient believes that disclosing t.A s to the public does not violate her/his privacy, s/he may simply set t.GN to ∅.
Generalization
We first clarify two fundamental concepts. By a simple transformation, we can use the interval representation for the general domains of both numeric and categorical attributes. Notice that, when A is categorical, a general domain is determined by a set of nodes in the taxonomy of A, whose subtrees do not overlap, but cover all the leaves. (For instance, in Figure 2 , nodes respiratory-system-problem and digestion-systemproblem decide a general domain of Disease.) Clearly, A can be converted to a numeric attribute by imposing a 1D ordering on the leaves of its taxonomy: the left-most leaf is mapped to value 1, its neighbor to 2, and so on. Thus, a partition of A can be denoted as an interval. For example, the partition corresponding to respiratory-system-problem in Figure 2 is an interval of [1, 6] . In the second step, SA-generalization (SA stands for "sensitive attribute"), we consider each QI-group in turn, and select a tailored generalization function on A s . Note that, unlike the previous step where all tuples are processed with identical generalization functions, SA-generalization uses a different function for each group. This strategy achieves less information loss, by allowing each group to decide the amount of necessary generalization. Figure 3 shows a possible result of our entire generalization scheme for Figure 1a . The table contains 5 QI-groups: the first one includes tuples 1-4, the second involves tuples 5-6, the third only tuple 7, the fourth tuples 8-9, and the fifth group consists of the last tuple. Note that the sensitive value flu of tuple 7 is retained directly, while the same disease of tuple 10 is generalized to respiratory-infection. This is legal because, as mentioned earlier, SA-generalization may choose a different generalization function for each QI-group.
DEFINITION 5 (GENERALIZATION
None of the existing methods permits SA-generalization. In fact, as demonstrated in Section 5, SA-generalization may produce a In Figure 1a , for example, considerable Age precision will be lost by generalizing the QI values of Mary (tuple 10), as discussed in Section 1.1. An alternative approach is to generalize her disease flu to respiratory-infection, leaving the other QI values intact. As shown in Figure 3 , this leads to an age-interval [26, 30] for tuples 8-9 that is much tighter than their age representation [21, 60] in Figure 1c . If we publish the table in Figure 3 , an adversary can find out that flu is the real disease of Mary only with probability 1/3 (flu is the guarding node set by Mary), as explained in Section 2.3. Intuitively, this is because 3 different diseases exist in the subtree of respiratory-infection (the sensitive value of tuple 10 in Figure 3 ).
Combinatorial Process of Privacy Attack
Consider an adversary who attempts to infer the sensitive data of an individual o from T * . 
Sreal(o) to refer to the set of individuals, who have tuples in T generalized to EG(o).
Note that S real (o) is unknown to an adversary. To derive S real (o), the adversary must resort to an external dataset, and retrieve a set Sext(o) of persons that may be concerned in EG(o). Sext(o) is defined as follows.
DEFINITION 8 (EXTERNAL INDIVIDUAL SET Sext). Given an essential QI-group EG(o), and an external database
DBext, Sext(o) consists of the people o ∈ DBext, such that o .A qi i (1 ≤ i ≤ d) is
covered by the i-th QI-value of EG(o).
To illustrate the above concepts, assume that an adversary tries to infer the disease of Ken from Figure 3 , having his age 6, sex, and zipcode 18000. The essential QI-group EG(Ken) consists of tuples 1-4, i.e., S real (Ken) equals {Andy, Bill, Ken, Nash}. Attempting to derive S real (Ken), the adversary consults the external database in Figure 1b , and obtains Sext(Ken) = {Andy, Bill, Ken, Nash, Mike}.
In general 
Primary Case
We first consider the case where T.A i is the primary key of T , i.e., each individual has at most one tuple in T . This is the only scenario addressed in the previous work [5, 7, 8, 9, 11, 13, 15, 17] .
DEFINITION 9. (PRIMARY POSSIBLE RECONSTRUCTION).

In the Primary Case, given an individual o, a possible reconstruction of the essential QI-group EG(o) includes
is taken as the owner of tj;
, vj is taken as the real sensitive value of tj. EXAMPLE 1. We explain the definition by continuing our example, where the adversary has derived Sext(Ken) = {Andy, Bill, Ken, Nash, Mike}. As mentioned earlier, m = 4, n = 5, and t * 1 , ..., t * 4 are tuples 1-4 in Figure 3 , respectively.
To obtain a possible reconstruction, the adversary first assigns o1, ..., o4 to 4 different persons in Sext(Ken). As a possible assignment, o1 = Mike, o2 = Nash, o3 = Andy, and o4 = Ken. Then, the adversary sets v1 to gastric-ulcer, which is the only potential value of v1, because t * 1 .A s = gastric-ulcer is a leaf node in the Diseasetaxonomy. For the same reason, v2 must be dyspepsia. On the other hand, v3 (v4) can be any of the 3 leaf diseases under t *
The possible reconstruction is completed by assuming, for instance, v3 = flu and v4 = bronchitis.
According to the reconstruction, the adversary thinks that Mike, Nash, Andy, Ken contracted gastric-ulcer, dyspepsia, flu, and bronchitis, respectively. Note that a reconstruction most likely is not equivalent to the microdata (where Mike does not even exist); instead, it is only a conjecture by the adversary. Nevertheless, the previous reconstruction violates the privacy requirement enforced by the guarding node of tuple 3 in Figure 1a (i.e., Ken does not want people to think that he had any respiratory infection). Interestingly, the breach happens when Ken is associated with tuple 4, instead of his original tuple 3 in the microdata.
It is important to understand the probabilistic nature of possible reconstructions. In fact, o1, ..., o4 can be decided in Permu(5, 4) = 120 ways 2 . For each decision, by the reasoning explained earlier, v1 and v2 are fixed, but 3 2 = 9 choices exist for setting v3 and v4. Hence, there exist totally 120 × 9 = 1080 possible reconstructions.
432 reconstructions breach the privacy requirement of tuple 3 in Figure 1 . Specifically, a reconstruction is breaching if and only if either o3 or o4 equals Ken. If o3 = Ken, then there are Permu(4, 3) = 24 choices to formulate o1, o2, o4, and 9 possibilities to determine v1, ..., v4, leading to 24 × 9 = 216 reconstructions. Symmetrically, if o4 = Ken, there exist another 216 breaching reconstructions.
Without further information, the adversary assumes that each reconstruction happens with identical likelihood. Hence, the breach probability of tuple 3 in the microdata equals 432/1080 = 2/5.
Non-primary Case
We proceed to analyze the case where T.A i is not the primary key of T , namely, each individual can appear an arbitrary number of times in T . No previous work has addressed this scenario before. In a possible reconstruction, the adversary may set all of o1, ..., o4 to Ken (which is not allowed in the Primary Case). The way that v1, ..., v4 are decided is identical to that in Example 1; let us again assume v1 = gastric-ulcer, v2 = dyspepsia, v3 = flu, and v4 = bronchitis. By this reconstruction, the adversary thinks that Ken contracted all the 4 diseases. Evidently, the conjecture does not correctly reflect the microdata, but it causes a privacy breach for tuple 3 in Figure 1a .
DEFINITION 10. (NONPRIMARY POSSIBLE RECONSTRUC-TION
Since each of o1, ..., o4 can independently be any of {Andy, Bill, Ken, Nash, Mike}, 5 4 = 625 choices exist for deciding o1, ..., o4. Given each decision, due to the reasons presented in Example 1, there are 9 ways to formulate v1, ..., v4. Therefore, the total number of possible reconstructions equals 625 × 9 = 5625.
A reconstruction breaches the privacy constraint of tuple 3 in the microdata, if and only if Ken is assigned to o3 or o4. If o3 = Ken, o1, o2, o4 may be any person in Sext(Ken), and hence, can be assigned in 5 3 = 125 manners. Regardless of the assignment, v1, ..., v4 may be set in 9 ways, resulting in 125 × 9 = 1125 different reconstructions. Similarly, another 1125 exist if o4 = Ken, but some of them (where o3 = o4 = Ken) have been counted twice. Specifically, if o3 = o4 = Ken, there are 25 possibilities for determining o1 and o2, whereas, for each possibility, 9 choices exist for deciding v1, ..., v4. Hence, the number of double-counted reconstructions equals 25 × 9 = 225. Therefore, totally 1125 + 1125 − 225 = 2025 reconstructions breach the privacy of tuple 3 in Figure 1a . Thus, the breach probability of the tuple equals 2025/5625 = 9/25.
Deriving a breach probability through the above procedures is quite cumbersome. In the next section, we present closed formulae that return the probability directly. Then, it will become simple to verify that publishing the table of Figure 3 allows no tuple in Figure 1a to be breached with a probability more than 50%.
THEORETICAL FOUNDATION
In this section, we solve the probability P breach (ttar) formulated in Definition 3, where ttar is an arbitrary tuple in T (the subscript means "target"). Obviously, if the guarding node ttar.GN of t tar is ∅, P breach (ttar) = 0, i.e., no privacy control is required. Next, we focus on ttar.GN = ∅. Section 3.1 first clarifies the notations and their properties, which will be used in our derivation. Then, Section 3.2 solves P breach (ttar) into closed formulae, based on which Section 3.3 points out the defects of k-anonymity.
Notations and Basic Properties
Following the notations in Section 2.3, we use otar to denote the person identified by ttar.A i , and t * tar for the generalized tuple of ttar. Furthermore, let m be the size of the corresponding essential QI-group EG(otar) (Definition 7), whose tuples are represented as t * 1 , ..., t * m (one of which is t * tar ), respectively. S real (otar) refers to the set of individuals whose records (in the microdata T ) are generalized to EG(otar). Finally, we deploy n for the cardinality of Sext(otar) (Definition 8).
As a direct corollary of Formula 1, we have:
In 
Derivation of the Breach Probability
As clarified in Section 2.3, to infer the A s value of otar, an adversary reconstructs EG(otar) according to Definition 9 (or 10) in the primal (or non-primal) scenario. In any case, we use nrecon to capture the total number of possible reconstructions, and n breach for the number of reconstructions violating the privacy constraint enforced by ttar.GN . It follows that
The next two theorems solve P breach (ttar) for the primal and nonprimary cases, respectively. 
Then, Equation 3 can be solved as P breach (ttar) = b/n. EXAMPLE 3. We illustrate the theorem using Figures 1a, 1b , and 3. Assume ttar (or t * tar ) to be tuple 3 in Figure 1a To demonstrate the second case of the theorem, let ttar (or t * tar ) be tuple 5 in Figure 1a 
Combining the above analysis with Equation 3, we obtain
EXAMPLE 4. Let ttar be tuple 3 of Figure 1a . As explained in Example 3, n = 5, b = 2, and t * tar .A s is in SUBTR(ttar.GN ). Theorem 2 shows that P breach (ttar) is 1 − (1 − 1/5) 2 = 9 / 25, which is consistent with the derivation in Example 2.
To demonstrate the second case, assume ttar to be tuple 5 in Figure 1a . As mentioned in Example 3, n = 2, b = 2, c = 1/3, and t * tar .A s is not in SUBTR(ttar.GN ). Thus, P breach (ttar) is 1 − (1 − 1/(3 × 2)) 2 = 11/36.
Drawbacks of k-anonymity
A k-anonymous table is obtained only with QI-generalization, i.e., all the A s values in the original table T are directly retained. kanonymity does not consider personal privacy preferences, which is equivalent to setting the guarding node of each tuple t ∈ T directly to t.A s . Hence, k-anonymity can be regarded as a special case of our personalized technique.
All the above concepts (e.g., "essential QI-group" and "possible reconstructions") extend to k-anonymity in a natural manner. Therefore, Theorems 1 and 2 also capture the privacy protection quality of k-anonymity. We start with the Primary Case. k-anonymity guarantees that the size m of each QI-group must be at least k. Let us consider the worst scenario, where the adversary has a "perfect" external database such that Sext(otar) = S real (otar), i.e., the external source does not contain any person irrelevant to the microdata. Thus, in Theorem 1, n equals |S real (otar)|, which (for the Primary Case) is equivalent to m. Hence, the breach probability evaluates to b/m. The value of b, however, may reach m, if all the tuples in EG(otar) have the same A s value. When this happens, the breach probability equals 100%, i.e., an adversary can infer the exact information of otar with full confidence (as is the case explained in Section 1.1 for Joe).
In fact, k-anonymity provides strong protection only if the external database consulted by an adversary may include many individuals that do not exist in the microdata, so that n is by far larger than |S real (otar)| = m. In particular, if the ratio between n and m exceeds b, the breach probability b/n in Theorem 1 is at most 1/m, which, in turn, is at most 1/k, i.e., the target protection level of k-anonymity.
Machanavajjhala et al. [11] also observed the above problem, and partially solved it with a new concept of "l-diversity". The essence of l-diversity is to ensure that the sensitive values in each QI-group are sufficiently diverse. Consider that we group the tuples in the QI-group by their sensitive values, and call each resulting group a "sub-group". Assume that p percent of the tuples in the QI-group appear in the largest sub-group. l-diversity ensures that 3 p is at most p breach , the highest permissible breach probability.
Theorem 1 theoretically confirms that the strategy of l-diversity indeed works. In fact, if n equals m, the breach probability b/n is exactly the percentage of tuples in EG(otar) having the sensitive value t * tar .A s (in other words, l-diversity essentially guarantees b/m ≤ p ≤ p breach ). Since, by Inequality 2, n is at least |S real (otar)| (= m in the Primary Case), l-diversity ensures that b/n is at most p breach for all tuples.
In the Non-primary Case, however, |S real (otar)| is no longer m; instead, as mentioned in Section 3.1, |S real (otar)| does not depend on m any more, and can always be 1 regardless of m. As a result, neither k-anonymity and l-diversity can guarantee low breach probability. In the worst case, both techniques allow an adversary to obtain the sensitive value of otar with 100% probability. This happens when otar is the only person in both S real (otar) and Sext(otar), i.e., all the tuples in EG(otar) concern otar, and no other individual in the external source can be involved in EG(otar). As a result, n equals 1, and, by Theorem 2, the breach probability is 1.
What is neglected by k-anonymity and l-diversity? The effect of |S real (otar)|! As discussed earlier, k-anonymity ensures m ≥ k, and l-diversity guarantees b/m ≤ p breach , but neither m nor b/m is a component in deriving the breach probability (see Theorem 2). In particular, a major component n is not captured -n can be very small, no matter how large (or small) m (or b/m) is. 
GENERALIZATION ALGORITHM
Figure 4: Algorithm for computing personalized generalization
The overall information loss IL tuple (t * ) of a generalized tuple t * equals 
The Greedy Framework
As elaborated in Section 2.2, our generalization scheme includes two steps. The first phase applies QI-generalization on T , using a set of generalization functions S = {f1, ..., f d } on the d QIattributes, respectively. Then, the second step produces the final T * by performing SA-generalization on the resulting QI-groups, employing a specialized generalization function for each QI-group. Hence, the quality of T * depends on (i) the choice of S, and (ii) the effectiveness of SA-generalization. We provide a solution for settling the first issue in this subsection, and deal with (ii) in Section 4. Figure 4 presents a greedy algorithm for achieving this purpose (the pseudocode also explains the framework of calculating T * ). At Lines 1-2, we obtain the simplest fi (1 ≤ i ≤ d) The situation is different, if f1 concerns a categorical attribute, e.g., Disease (strictly speaking, Disease is not a QI-attribute in Figure 1c ; but no confusion should be caused by borrowing it to illustrate the refinement of f1). For example, suppose that respiratorysystem-problem is one of the partitions (in the taxonomy of Figure 2) deciding f1. Using the transformation stated in Section 2.2, we can represent respiratory-system-problem with an interval [1, 6] (by converting the leaf nodes under the partition to values 1-6, respectively). Note that, it is not possible to split the partition into, for instance, [1, 2] and [3, 6] . As formulated in Definition 4, each partition of a categorical attribute must be a node in the corresponding taxonomy. Here, [1, 2] cannot be mapped to any node in Figure 2 . In fact, there is only one possible split for respiratory-systemproblem, i.e., breaking its interval [1, 6] to sub-intervals [1, 3] and [4, 6] .
In general, the number of possible refinements for a categorical f1 equals exactly the number of non-leaf partitions of f1. For example, assuming that f1 is determined by respiratory-systemproblem and digestive-system-problem, we can refine it into 2 different generalization functions with a single split. A round of the greedy algorithm. We are ready to elaborate each round of the algorithm in Figure 4 . Before a round starts, the algorithm has obtained a publishable table T * , with a set of QIgeneralization functions S = {f1, ..., f d }. At the beginning of the round, we duplicate T * and S into T * best and S best , respectively (Line 7).
Next, the algorithm examines (Line 8) all possible sets of refined functions S = {f 1 , ..., f d }, obtained by performing one split over a single function in S (i.e., S shares d − 1 identical functions with S). Given an S , Lines 9-11 perform QI-and SAgeneralizations to calculate a publishable T * , in the same manner as Lines 3-5, except that multiple QI-groups may be produced after the QI-generalization. If T * incurs smaller information loss (computed with Equation 6) than our current best solution T * best (Line 12), T * and S replace T * best and S best respectively (Line 13). We provide a heuristic to reduce computation time. Since S differs from S in only one element, the QI-generalization based on S can be computed incrementally from that based on S (which is available from the previous round). Furthermore, if the same QIgroup G results from both QI-generalizations, its SA-generation does not need to be re-computed. Similarly, in deriving the information loss IL table (T * ), the contribution of the tuples in G needs not be re-calculated, either.
The round finishes, after all S has been considered. Line 14 checks if a better solution (compared to the one discovered prior to this round) has been found. If not, the algorithm terminates by returning T * best . Otherwise, another round is executed, after setting T * (or S) to T * best (or S best ) at Line 16.
Optimal SA-generalization
Let G be an arbitrary QI-group output by performing QIgeneralization on T . Without loss of generality, assume that G contains m tuples t 1 , ..., t m . We use G to denote the set of corresponding tuples {t1, ..., tm} in the microdata T . Specifically, for each j ∈ [1, m] GN ) ). Since tx.GN is in SUBTR(ty.GN ), bx ≤ by. By Theorems 1 and 2, we have P breach (tx) ≤ P breach (ty) (the values of c and n are equivalent in computing the two probabilities).
Therefore, in searching for the optimal SA-generalization, we can avoid checking the breach probabilities of the tuples like tx in Lemma 2, because they must be adequately protected once the privacy information of the other tuples is secured. GN ) . Consider the values of b, c, and n in calculating P breach (tj) with Theorem 1 or 2. Both c and n remain the same before and after the SA-generalization. Since SA-generalization never reduces b, P breach (tj) cannot have decreased after the SA-generalization, leading to a contradiction. Based on the above properties, Figure 5 shows an algorithm that finds the optimal SA-generalization for the given QI-group G . : a QI-group G with tuples t 1 , . .., t m after QI-generalization Output: a set G * of tuples t * 1 , ..., t * m in the final publishable T * 1. G = the set of tuples t1, ..., tm in T generalized to G ; G * = {t 1 , ..., t m } 2. S prob = the set of tuples t ∈ G such that t.GN is not in the subtree of the guarding node of any other tuple in G 3. S bad = the set of tuples t ∈ G satisfying P breach (t) > p breach /* In the Primary Case, P breach (t) is computed from Theorem 1, replacing n with the size of G. In the Non-primary Case, the computation is based on Theorem 2, replacing n with the number of distinct individuals involved in G. Line 1 initializes two sets G and G * . G collects all tuples t1, ..., tm in T generalized to G , while G * = G . Line 2 creates a set S prob as follows. For each tuple t ∈ G, if its guarding node t.GN is not in SUBTR(t .GN ) of any other tuple t ∈ G, t is added to S prob . By Lemma 2, once the privacy requirements of the tuples in S prob are satisfied, the requirements of the other tuples are also fulfilled.
LEMMA 3. For any tuple tj
For each tuple t ∈ S prob , the algorithm calculates P breach (t) according to Theorem 1 or 2 (based on the current, nongeneralized, A s values in G * ). If P breach (t) is larger than p breach , t is placed in a set S bad (Line 3), that is, S bad includes the tuples in S prob whose privacy constraints have not been satisfied after QIgeneralization.
Next, we consider each tuple t ∈ S bad in turn (Line 4). (Lines 6-8 ). The algorithm terminates (Line 9) if P breach (t) does not exceed p breach for any tuple t ∈ S prob . Otherwise (P breach (t) > p breach for some tuple t), we must decrease P breach (t) by generalizing t * .A s further (t * is the tuple in G * corresponding to t). If t * .A s is already the root of the taxonomy (Line 10), the algorithm returns, reporting that no appropriate SA-generalization can be found (Line 11). In fact, in this case, the A s values of all tuples in G * have been generalized to the root, so that no more generalization is possible.
If t * .A s is not the root, we raise t * .A s "one level up" in the taxonomy, by replacing it with its parent (Line 12). After this, the A s values of some other tuples may also need to be raised, due to the reasoning for Lines 6-8. These changes may increase the breach probabilities of some tuples. Hence, the algorithm returns to Line 9 to check whether any probability is above p breach . If yes, the above procedures are repeated.
The computation of P breach (t) deserves further clarification. The value of n in Theorems 1 and 2 is unavailable when T * is being computed (i.e., we do not know which external database will be consulted by an adversary). Hence, as a conservative approach, we replace n with its lower bound |S real (otar)| (Inequality 2). If the breach probability computed with this lower bound is at most p breach , then the actual breach probability derived by an adversary will definitely be bounded by p breach .
The following theorem proves that Figure 5 produces an SAgeneralization that minimizes Equation 7. THEOREM 3. Let t * 1 , ..., t * m be the tuples returned by the algorithm in Figure 5, and t 
EXPERIMENTS
This section experimentally evaluates the effectiveness of our technique using a popular dataset 4 in the literature [5, 7, 8, 9, 11] . The dataset contains a relation with 100k tuples, each storing information of an American adult. The relation has 6 columns: Age, Education, Gender, Marital-status, Occupation, and Income. The first two columns are numerical, whereas Gender, Marital-status, Occupation are categorical; these 5 columns are the QI attributes.
Income is the sensitive attribute, and its values fall in the range of [0, 50k). We categorize the column as follows. First, the domain is evenly divided into 50 ranges (i.e., each has a length of 1k), which constitute the leaves of the taxonomy. Then, every 5 consecutive leaves are grouped as the child of a level-2 node. Recursively, every two level-2 nodes are grouped under a level-3 node. This results in five level-3 nodes, which are the children of the root. Note that the fanouts (5, 2, 5 at levels 2, 3, 4, respectively) are chosen simply to create a balanced taxonomy; other fanouts may also be used, without affecting the experiment results significantly.
We add a unique ID to each tuple to obtain a "primary relation" (each individual has exactly one record). Personal references are generated in two ways, leading to datasets Pri-leaf and Pri-mixed. Specifically, in Pri-leaf, the guarding node of each tuple is identical to its sensitive value (i.e., all guarding nodes are leaves of the taxonomy), simulating the scenario where no personal privacy preference is allowed. In Pri-mixed, tuples are randomly divided into 3 groups which account for 10%, 30%, and 60% of the relation, respectively. For each tuple in the first (or second) group, its guarding node is the parent of its sensitive value (or is ∅). The guarding nodes of the tuples in the last group are their sensitive values.
We also synthesize a "non-primary relation" as follows. First, 50k arbitrary persons are sampled from the primary relation, and added to the non-primary relation. Then, among these 50k persons, we extract three disjoint subsets, each containing 50k/3 random persons. For each person o in the first subset, we create a tuple in the non-primary relation whose ID and QI values are equivalent to those of o, but its sensitive value is generated following the distribution of Income in the primary relation. Hence, o corresponds to 2 tuples in the non-primary relation. Similarly, for each person in the second subset, two tuples are created as described earlier, i.e., the person corresponds to 3 tuples. The last subset is directly included in the final relation, whose cardinality is, therefore, 100k. Based on the non-primary relation, we generate personal preferences in the same manner as in Pri-leaf and Pri-mixed, leading to datasets Nonpri-leaf and Nonpri-mixed, respectively.
The maximum permissible breach probability p breach is fixed to 0.25. As mentioned in Section 4, our generalization algorithm requires penalty factors w 
Quality of Privacy Protection
In this section, we compare the quality of privacy protection offered by k-anonymity, l-diversity (which improves k-anonymity as mentioned in Section 3.3), and our personalized approach. The value of k for k-anonymity equals 1/p breach = 4. As with personalized, l-diversity takes a single parameter 5 p breach = 0.25. The value of w s is fixed to 1. In the following experiments, each breach probability is computed from Theorem 1 or 2, replacing n with its lower bound in Equation 2.
In the first experiment, we use the 3 methods to generalize dataset Pri-leaf, respectively. In each case, we compute the breach probability of each original tuple with respect to the generalized table. For each method, the probabilities of all tuples are sorted in descending order, as demonstrated in Figure 6a . Since the 3 curves differ primarily in the behavior of the tuples in the first 2.5% of the corresponding sorted lists, Figure 6b plots the probabilities for only these tuples.
k-anonymity cannot achieve the required level of protection, because the breach probabilities of some tuples are significantly 5 The parameter p breach has the same functionality as the notation c in [11] . Since we do not consider an adversary's background knowledge, the other parameters of l-diversity are inapplicable. higher than p breach = 0.25. As mentioned in Section 1, kanonymity prevents accurate association between individuals and tuples, but does not provide direct protection against association between individuals and sensitive values. Both l-diversity and personalized guarantee adequate preservation. Interestingly, the curve of personalized is above that of l-diversity, which indicates that personalized performs less generalization, i.e., just enough to meet the privacy requirements. Indeed, the table output by personalized has information loss 3123 (calculated with Equation 6), as opposed to 184845 for the l-diverse table.
Figures 6c and 6d illustrate similar results for dataset Nonprileaf. As predicted in Section 3.3, neither k-anonymity nor ldiversity can satisfy the privacy constraints of all tuples. In particular, k-anonymity (l-diversity) allows some tuples to be inferred with a probability higher than 70% (40%), whereas Personalized still guarantees that the breach probabilities of all tuples are bounded by p breach .
In the previous experiments, the guarding node of each tuple equals its original sensitive value, i.e., the no-personalization scenario assumed by the previous work. Next, we study personalized scenarios, by repeating the same experiments on datasets Priand Nonpri-mixed, respectively. For k-anonymity and l-diversity (which are not aware of personal preferences), their generalized tables are identical to those for Pri-and Nonpri-leaf, respectively. Figure 7 presents the results. Our technique is again the only one that can achieve the required protection degree for an entire dataset. For k-anonymity and l-diversity, as expected, more tuples have breach probabilities above p breach , compared to the results on non-personalized datasets ( Figure 6 ). In Figures 7a and 7c , for each solution, 30% of the tuples have breach probability 0, because they are the tuples whose guarding nodes are ∅.
In summary, we showed that our solution guarantees privacy preserving in all cases. We also confirmed the finding in Section 3.3 that k-anonymity, as well as its improved version l-diversity, fails to satisfy the privacy requirements in most scenarios. Hence, the two methods are omitted in the subsequent experiments.
Accuracy of Data Analysis
In this section, we aim at establishing the fact that SAgeneralization is beneficial since, compared to pure quasi-identifer Given a dataset T , we compute a generalized table T * with the algorithm in Figure 4 , use it to obtain estimated query results, and examine their relative error. Specifically, if est is an estimated result, its relative error equals |act − est|/act, where act is the actual query result from T . To derive est, we compute, for each tuple t * ∈ T * , the probability p that t * satisfies the query, after which est is set to the sum of such probabilities of all tuples. Let t be the original tuple in T of t * . For a type-1 query, p equals the probability that the sensitive value t.A s of t falls in the query interval, assuming that t.A s is uniformly distributed in t * .A s . For a type-2 query, following the same idea, we first obtain the probabilities that t satisfies the two query conditions respectively, using the uniform assumption; then, p equals the product of the two probabilities.
Answering a type-1 query accurately requires retaining as much information on A s as possible, while answering type-2 queries accurately demands retaining sufficient information on all attributes. SA-generalization reduces the precision of sensitive values, while preserving more information on the other attributes; hence, it favors type-2 queries. Pure QI-generalization, on the other hand, allows type-1 queries to be precisely processed (i.e., no error), since it retains complete information on A s . As a tradeoff, it applies much more generalization on the QI attributes, and thus, cannot support type-2 queries as well as SA-generalization. Each workload contains 10000 queries. We vary the number of queries of each type using a parameter r ∈ [0, 1]. Specifically, r equals the percentage of type-1 queries in a workload. We inspect two values 0.1 and 0.9 of r; r = 0.1 (0.9) leads to a workload where type-2 (-1) queries are significantly more frequent.
In the experiment of Figure 8a , we set r to 0.1, and deploy the non-personalized datasets Pri-leaf and Nonpri-leaf. We create generalized tables for a wide spectrum of w s from 1 to 100. Recall that a larger w s indicates a higher information-loss penalty of generalizing the sensitive attribute. We also create a generalized table using w s = ∞, which is equivalent to disabling SA-generalization, as mentioned in Section 4. In other words, the performance at w s = ∞ represents the effectiveness of pure QI-generalization. Figure 8a plots the average error of a workload as a function of w s . For each average, we also demonstrate the sum of the average and the standard deviation of the errors (in the workload). The sum, depicted as the top of a vertical bar, equals approximately the 8500-highest error. For both Pri-leaf and Nonpri-leaf, the best w s equals 1, i.e., we should treat all the attributes equally in generalization. Pure QI-generalization, on the other hand, does not permit robust analysis since it leads to average error nearly 30% (5 times that of w s = 1), and huge variance. This is expected because a workload with r = 0.1 is populated mostly with type-2 queries, for which pure QI-generalization has poor performance, due to the reasons explained earlier. Figure 8b shows the results of the same experiment for r = 0.9, i.e., most queries in a workload are type-1 queries. All values of w s result in average error below 5%. Although pure QI-generalization has small average error, the accuracy of its estimated answers again has significant variance. This phenomenon happens because the generalized table computed by w s = ∞ incurs huge error for type-2 queries (even though type-1 queries can be perfectly processed). On the other hand, the table computed by w s = 1 performs reasonably well for both query types, leading to small average error and variance.
Figures 8c and 8d illustrate the results of the above experiments on the personalized datasets Pri-mixed and Nonpri-mixed respectively. These results are consistent with those for the nonpersonalized datasets. In both diagrams, the average error and variance are similar when w s varies between 40 and 100, because the generalized tables obtained with these values are almost identical.
To summarize, we demonstrated that SA-generalization should be considered in practice. Our experiments suggest that it is reasonable to treat all attributes equally in generalization, which leads to a more useful table for analysis than pure QI-generalization in most cases.
Computation Cost
Finally, we evaluate the overhead of performing personalized generalization. Figure 9 shows the execution time of our algorithm ( Figure 4 ) in producing the generalized tables used in the experi-ments of Figure 8 , as a function of w s . The algorithm terminates in less than 4 minutes in all cases. Except for minor random irregularities (of Pri-mixed in Figure 9b ), the cost decreases as w s increases. This is because, the higher w s , the less SA-generalization is possible such that the function of Figure 5 entails smaller overhead.
RELATED WORK
Since the introduction of k-anonymity in [13, 15] , numerous algorithms [5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 13, 15, 17] have been proposed to obtain kanonymous tables. These algorithms can be divided into two categories, according to the constraints imposed on generalization. The first category employs "full-domain generalization" [13] , which assumes a hierarchy on each QI attribute, and requires that all the partitions in a general domain should be at the same level of the hierarchy. For example, if the value pneumonia in Figure 2 is generalized to respiratory-infection, then gastric-ulcer must also be generalized to stomach-disease. Such a constraint is adopted by the binary search algorithm in [13] , the exhaustive search method [15] , and the apriori-like dynamic programming approach [9] , all of which minimize information loss based on various metrics.
The second category (i.e., "full-subtree recoding" as termed in [9] ) drops the same-level requirement mentioned earlier, since it often leads to unnecessary information loss [8] . Following this idea, Iyengar [8] develops a genetic algorithm, whereas greedy algorithms are proposed in [7] and [17] , based on top-down and bottom-up generalization, respectively. These approaches, however, do not minimize information loss. Bayardo and Agrawal [5] remedy the problem with the power-set search strategy. Our work also belongs to this category, but significantly extends it to incorporate customized privacy needs.
Several other works investigate the characteristics of kanonymity. For example, Aggarwal [2] discusses the curse of dimensionality related to k-anonymity. In particular, he shows that it is not possible to create even a 2-anonymous table in high dimensional space without considerable information loss. Yao et al. [18] propose a solution for checking whether a set of views violate k-anonymity. Zhong et al. [19] devise a protocol for obtaining k-anonymous tables in distributed environments.
Machanavajjhala et al. [11] observe the first drawback of kanonymity discussed in Section 1. They propose l-diversity to enhance privacy protection. However, as analyzed in Section 3.3, for the Non-primary Case, this approach may still allow an adversary to discover sensitive data with full confidence.
Recently, Wang et al. [16] present a method which computes the publishable information, by taking into account a set of "templates" specified by data owners. These templates formulate individuals' privacy constraints in the form of association rules. Focusing on the Primary Case, the authors of [16] develop an algorithm that generates the releasable data using "suppression" [3, 12] (as opposed to generalization in this paper).
Finally, it is worth mentioning that privacy preservation can also be achieved using other methodologies, including data perturbation [4] , query result perturbation [6] , and other earlier solutions proposed in the area of statistics [1] .
CONCLUSIONS
The existing generalization methods are inadequate because they cannot guarantee privacy protection in all cases, and often incur unnecessary information loss by performing excessive generalization. In this paper, we propose the concept of personalized anonymity, and develop a new generalization framework that takes into account customized privacy requirements. Our technique successfully prevents privacy intrusion even in scenarios where the existing approaches fail, and results in generalized tables that permit accurate aggregate analysis.
This work also lays down a solid theoretical foundation for developing alternative generalization strategies. For instance, the greedy algorithm presented in this paper is not optimal, in the sense that it does not necessarily achieve the lowest information loss. Finding the optimal solution is a challenging problem. As another example, in practice, the recipients of the published data are often specialized users (e.g. scientists), who may explicitly specify the analytical tasks (such as association rule mining [14] ) required. This information may be utilized to release a table that is highly effective for those tasks, without breaching the privacy constraints formulated by data owners.
